

Education and Increasing Religious Pluralism in Latin America

The Case of Chile

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At the end of the 1980s, according to some scholars, Latin America was becoming Protestant (Martin 1990; Stoll 1990). However, in the first decade of the twenty-first century the growth of evangelical churches has stopped, or at least their rate of growth has slowed. At the same time, it is evident that in the last century the rate of growth of Catholics has systematically declined. The Latin American context has changed: it has passed from being a “Catholic continent” to being an increasingly religiously pluralist region.

Indeed, Latin America has ceased to be “Catholic” in the traditional sense of the term. The decline of Catholics has been paralleled by the increase in other religious expressions. Latin American countries vary considerably in their history and in the social and political weight of the institutional Roman Catholic Church and of Christian traditions in the collective mentality and civil society. Nevertheless, some general and common dynamics must be examined. With the exception of Cuba and Uruguay, in the last three or four decades the alternatives to Catholicism have come not mainly from the growth of nonbelievers and atheists but from the expansion of evangelicals, in particular, Pentecostals. Nevertheless, Latin America

is more “evangelical” only in relative and partial terms. The continent still remains a privileged space within world Catholicism: in 2004 the Catholic population of nineteen Latin American countries was approximately 447 million, or 48 percent of the nearly 932 million Catholics in the world. Yet, if Latin America has not become “Protestant,” neither does it continue to be “Catholic” in the same sense that it was at the beginning of the twentieth century.¹

These data suggest that the continent is *becoming increasingly religiously plural*. In other words, Latin America is still a majority-Catholic region—its religious and cultural mainstream is neither Protestant nor secular—but it is becoming more religiously diverse. The Catholic Church has recognized the challenges it faces. Using new methods, it has renewed its classical skirmish against secularism (“evangelization of culture”), and, beginning with the Medellín bishops’ conference (1968) and continuing with the Puebla (1979), Santo Domingo (1992), and Aparecida (2007) conferences, the church has acknowledged the threat of competition and religious pluralism (for example, the challenges of sects, new religious movements, and Pentecostals). But beneath the surface and less widely recognized in the media and in academic and public debate is the rise of such non-orthodox religious expressions as “diffuse religiosity,” “popular religiosity,” and other hermetic and New Age expressions. These have developed not as independent institutions, churches, or cults but often as syncretic mixtures in the minds of the faithful, who identify themselves as nominally “Catholic” and even “Protestant.”

Throughout Latin American history popular Catholicism has coexisted with various forms of syncretisms.² This is in fact one of the distinguishing features of Latin America’s history and sociology. In another work (Parker 1996b) I analyzed the emergence of new syncretisms, which aggregate traditional and historical forms. These new syncretic forms are, of course, much more tied to the process of modernization and educational reform than traditional and popular syncretisms whose origins lay in a distinct sociohistorical dynamic.

How do we explain these changes? What are the main social and cultural factors that are influencing these new tendencies toward religious pluralism among Latin Americans? Among the cultural factors that influence religious change are the consumer culture promoted by the market and the

new economy; the mass media and the revolution in communications and electronics; rapid changes in education; and the renewal of social and ethnic movements that affect the religious field (see Parker 2005). All these social and cultural factors are affecting the way the people represent themselves in their religious beliefs and practices—the social construction of their symbolic reality (see Berger and Luckmann, 1966)—with the consequence that many of the Catholic faithful no longer reproduce conventional forms of religious affiliation or adhere to the faith received from their parents.

As we shall see, there has been a boom in new “underground currents” of “superstitions” or “neopagan” contemporary religious tendencies.³ Nearly a third of Catholics, and even those who practice regularly, now adhere to these tendencies (see Parker 1999). There is not merely growing pluralism within institutional Catholicism and an increase of new religious movements or cults; in addition, ways of believing that are far removed from the institutional churches have emerged: for example, self-professed “Catholics in my own way,” or “believers without belonging” (to a church), as they are also termed (see Davie 2004).

The current decline of Catholicism can be traced in part to the church’s trajectory of the past four decades. But our hypothesis is that its decline did not originate in politics, historical processes, or conjunctural crises—as happened in the 1960s when national churches were confronted with political change and revolutionary movements, and in the 1970s and mid-1980s when they confronted authoritarian governments over human rights abuses.⁴ There have been many factors that have contributed to contemporary Latin American religious change—to opening up new ways of thinking and feeling about and acting on one’s relationship with the supernatural. Beyond the aforementioned changes in the culture of the market, the media, and the new technologies of communication and information—as well as ethnic issues and new social and ecological problems—the role of education, and the mental change it introduces, stands out as critical in enhancing religious pluralism.

In this chapter I contend that cultural factors involved in educational change set in motion a complex process in and through which religious expressions in the “religious field”⁵ have become more diverse. Cultural

factors also explain the related and simultaneous tendency toward rationalization (the appearance of nonbelievers and atheists) and spiritual revivals (of old currents such as popular mysticism and shamanism and popular new ones such as syncretism and New Age practices) that tend to delegitimize the central place official churches historically occupied in the religious socialization process. More specifically, modern education permits the individual to explore a wider cultural horizon with diverse lifestyles and opens him or her to a critical appraisal of things that tend to annihilate traditional morals, norms, and dogmas. Moreover, higher levels of schooling and the diversification of educational alternatives help to redefine cultural patterns and give rise to pluricultural societies.

Indeed, modern educational reforms that have been implemented in recent decades throughout Latin America under the auspices of the World Bank have introduced a different rationalization of schools and educational management and have diversified the educational supply. They have also introduced a more liberal culture that, in turn, has facilitated a greater acceptance of messages, beliefs, and heterodox rituals and a certain distrust of ecclesiastical institutions. These cultural changes have precipitated an increase in those who believe in religion "in my own way." Additionally, educational reforms, especially the pluralization and privatization of schools and universities, have facilitated the penetration of diverse religious confessions, congregations, and lay alternatives in the field of education. Structural changes such as the rise in enrollments at different educational levels and educational reforms may prove to decisively affect culture. Specifically, they might modify the mentality of young people and make them more open to change and diversity. This openness, in turn, legitimates different options in the spiritual and religious field.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first part I review how classic social theory looks at modernization and religious belief. Next, drawing on original survey data, I highlight the growing tendency of well-educated Chilean youth to identify themselves with self-styled religious beliefs. The third part examines in greater detail the role of education in framing religious options. The fourth part extends the analysis to consider other cases and speculates about the future of religious belief in Latin America given the increase in educational enrollments and the growing diversity of higher education.

Religion and the Rationalization of Social Life

Contrary to the classical secularization thesis (Martin 1978), Latin America has undergone several processes of modernization and rationalization in the last two decades that have not diminished the presence of religion in private and public life (Parker 1996b). What has changed, however, is the composition of the Latin American religious field itself (Parker 1998) and the significance of different institutional or noninstitutional religious orientations. The Latin American cases do not show the simple persistence of traditions that we find in diverse sociocultural contexts where traditional values have persisted alongside modernization and cultural changes (Inglehart and Baker 2000). What we are observing are specific religious changes.

The continuing importance of religion in the context of the different processes of modernization that are presently underway in Latin America, and the diversification of religious expressions, are not exclusively due to new evangelical preachers and the growing influence of Pentecostals.⁶ Other deep cultural factors are involved that are influencing the new, pluralistic religious panorama. In addition to the remaining importance of the churches—that is, the “official” religions—we must consider the increasing revitalization of numerous mass phenomena: namely, traditional popular religions or new syncretic forms associated with new religious movements or spiritual tendencies such as New Age or contemporary esotericism (Guerreiro 2003; Trombetta 2003; Carozzi 1999, 2000; Tavares Gomes 2000; Frigerio 1999; Van Hove 1999).

In this chapter I argue that these expressions are manifestations of the cultural changes that are being experienced by the younger generation in societies in which the religious field has historically been dominated by Catholicism, as was true in Chile and many other Hispanic countries. Indeed, young people are not immune from the complex influences of globalization (Pace 1997; Castells 1999), which, paradoxically, simultaneously facilitates the introduction of more pragmatic and secularized rationalities, on the one hand, and new spiritual currents and the revival of diverse faith expressions, on the other. Indeed, one of the principal debates concerning the relationship between religion and modernity is centered precisely on the

problem of the “rationality” of religion and its relationship with the rationalization of social life derived from modernization.

When discussing the relationship between religion and politics and religion and fanaticism, conservatives have attributed the source of many conflicts to a kind of irrational hatred (what Nietzsche would have called “resentment”) that is directed toward Western secularism, material wealth, and technology. The irrationality of this attitude is said to come from the rejection of the rationalization of social life, which, as we know, was studied by Weber (1958, 1963). Rationalization, a tendency based on the efficient calculation of means and the willingness to substitute alternative ends as equally valuable pursuits, manifests itself most saliently in capitalist economic activity and the global marketplace. As Pecora put it, “We then have a whole structure of explanation that juxtaposes anachronistic allegiance to what Weber called the *Wertrationalität* (or value-oriented rationality) of religious absolutes with the *Zweckrationalität* (or purposive rationality) of modern, capitalist, instrumental reason” (2003, 2).

According to Weber, the rationalization of social life in Western historical, capitalist contexts will bring about the *disenchantment of the world*. Asceticism—carried out of monastic cells into everyday life—began to dominate the “worldly morality” of the modern economic order. But as the modern economic order was bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production, and determined the lives of individuals in ways that were broader than those aspects of one’s life directly influenced by the economic market, the spirit of religious asceticism became progressively divorced from any economic motivations. Thus, religious asceticism lost its symbolic power to legitimize the economic spirit. Capitalism, which rests on mechanical foundations, emerged victorious, and the capitalist mode of production did not need religious legitimation of any sort. Material goods gained an increasing and ultimately an inexorable power over the lives of humans in a way without precedent in human history. For Weber, the mechanical foundations of industrial capitalism had its own forms of legitimation:

The rosy blush of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems also to be irretrievably fading, and the idea of duty in one’s calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs. Where the fulfill-

ment of the calling cannot directly be related to the highest spiritual and cultural values, or when, on the other hand, it need not be felt simply as economic compulsion, the individual generally abandons the attempt to justify it at all. (Weber 1958, 182)

If this was true of the modern capitalist societies that Weber studied, what then would we expect to happen in a developing society undergoing a rapid process of modernization *and* globalization?

Increasing Religious Alternatives among Chilean Youth

Contrary to Weberian secularization theory, in a country such as Chile, which is representative of the way in which the developing countries of Latin America are becoming integrated into global markets, cultural change takes forms that illustrate different trends. Among Chilean youth we find that the purposive rationality of market-oriented culture and its logic of competition is growing as a source of meaning for social action. And yet, in their religious orientations, Chilean youth neither reject value-oriented rationality nor do they fall into an irrational fanaticism. Rather, the more formally educated manifest an increased rationalization and a general tendency to open the scope of religious alternatives to include new types of diffused and syncretic religious expressions that have components of New Age beliefs and rituals and to reject beliefs related to institutionalized religions (that is, the churches).

The growing pluralization of religious alternatives among youth is confirmed by the Chilean National Censuses of 1992 and 2002 (INE 2003). Table 4.1 contrasts both age poles (the younger and the older generations) according to religious affiliation. In both 1992 and 2002 the highest proportion of evangelicals was found in the 15–29 age stratum. But the most salient tendency is the rapid increase among the “indifferent” (also termed “non-religionists”), “atheists,” and those claiming affiliation to “other religions.” The proportion of Catholics fell in this decade (Lehmann 2001, 2002; Parker 1996a) from 74 to 66 percent in the younger age cohort (those from 15 to 29 years old), a rate that contrasts sharply with that of the older generation (among whom it dropped only from 81 to 77 percent). Among

Table 4.1. Religious Affiliation by Age in Chile, 1992–2002
(in percent)

	1992		2002	
	15–29	60+	15–29	60+
Catholic	74.1	80.8	66.2	76.9
Evangelical	14.1	12.1	15.4	13.7
Non-Religionist/ Atheist	7.4	3.3	11.1	4.5
Other Religion	4.5	3.7	7.3	4.9

Source: Chilean National Census 1992, 2002 (INE 2003).

the younger generation the proportion of Catholics is decreasing more rapidly than evangelicals are growing. The alternative religions are rising slightly, and the number identifying as “indifferent” and “atheists” is growing steadily.

At first glance the data seem to suggest that the classic secularization thesis may have some merit after all. But this is not the case. In both 1992 and 2002 the census did not offer an alternative for people that, on the one hand, did not want to be identified with a church but, on the other, did not want to be considered antireligious. The only option on the census questionnaire for these people was “indifferent or atheist.” Data from other surveys, as we will see, suggest that the so-called non-religious or indifferent should be distinguished from antireligious atheists. Qualitative data has shown that most of the self-declared “indifferent” are indeed believers categorized as “without religion.” This means that they believe in God and in the majority of the basic Christian beliefs (having been born and socialized in a Christian culture), and they may even have a “spirituality of their own”; yet, at the same time, they distance themselves from churches and church doctrines, ethics, and clergy, which they consider to be alienating, repressive, or anachronistic. By contrast, atheists are a very small percentage of younger people. The general tendency of secularization to produce cultural change, which in the 1960s and 1970s predicted a large percentage

of atheist and antireligious affiliations in surveys and polls (see B. Smith 1982), has not been borne out.

Today, as many studies have suggested, the participation of youth in a variety of different religious expressions is very important. The Chilean National Youth Survey of 2000 (INJUV 2001) ($N = 3,701$) reveals that the majority of young people aged 15 to 30 identify themselves with some religion: Catholics account for 53 percent and a majority among women (58 percent) and the middle socioeconomic strata (56 percent) (Table 4.2). Evangelicals account for 11.7 percent, with the percentages even higher among women (13 percent) and the lower socioeconomic stratum (17 percent). The other religious groupings include the Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and other types of religious affiliation ("Believes in God and has another religion"). Nonbelievers constitute just fewer than 5 percent.

These data show the importance of the category of people who are believers but do not identify with any church. To underscore this point, the

Table 4.2. Belief in God and Religious Affiliation in Chile, 2000
(in percent)

Type of Believer	Total	Sex		Socioeconomic Level		
		Men	Women	High	Middle	Low
Catholic	53.0	48.6	57.5	54.3	55.5	46.8
Believes in God, without church	26.3	29.4	23.2	33.7	25.5	27.4
Evangelical	11.7	10.5	12.9	3.6	9.8	17.1
Doesn't believe in God	4.8	6.7	2.8	6.8	4.7	4.7
Believes in God, other denomination	1.6	2.3	0.9	0.1	1.5	2.1
Jehovah's Witness	1.3	1.3	1.4	0.0	1.5	1.2
Mormon	1.2	1.3	1.0	1.5	1.5	0.7
No Response	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0

Source: Third National Youth Survey, 2000 (INJUV 2001).

2000 survey included a new category, “Believes in God, without church.” Remarkably, more than a quarter of young respondents (those between 15 and 30 years old) chose this alternative. Men from the higher socioeconomic stratum predominate in this category. Generally speaking, these individuals have had more formal education and enjoy a higher standard of living—in other words, these are the individuals who are the most integrated into the modernization process.

In the past eight years I have conducted five surveys about religious affiliation (Table 4.3 reports results from the most recent four) in which I have introduced new measurements that reveal a great deal about the nature of religious change—in particular, that youth still believe but distance themselves from and distrust religious authorities.⁷ The data from the National Youth Survey utilizes the modified measures we first used in our Popular Religion Survey in 1997–1998 in a municipality of Santiago, Chile (Parker 1999) and in 1998–1999 for our Secondary Students Survey, a study requested by the National Planning Ministry and that focused on new cultural traits of students in Chile (Parker 2000). The “believer without religion” category borrowed from previous qualitative research as a form of self-identification for people who did not want to be identified as affiliated with a church but also did not consider themselves to be antireligious, and the “Catholic in my own way” category was used to capture the views of Catholics who wish to stress their autonomy from the official positions of their church. These categories offer an innovative methodology for measuring religious affiliation that contrasts with the classical form of religious affiliation measurement that asks only about affiliation with established churches. The introduction of this new measure for the survey responses also introduces a new sociological perspective on the complexity of religious identity and the limits of the role that institutional churches play in the social construction of religious meaning by ordinary people.

The Secondary Students Survey (Parker 2000) conducted in 1998–1999 was administered to 643 secondary school students from different socioeconomic backgrounds and two different parts of the country: the Metropolitan Region (Santiago) and the VIII Region (Concepción Province). The University Sample Survey, conducted in 2001, consisted of a sample of 515 university students from the Universidad de Santiago de Chile, one of the main public universities in the country (Parker, Peña, and Barria 2002).

The Metropolitan Region Survey, from which we draw our religious data, was a study of public opinion about the penal system conducted for the Department of Justice in October 2004 (Parker and Peña 2005; religious data available from author). It was based on a general representative sample ($N=1,202$) of the entire population of the metropolitan region (the greater Santiago area of six million people and its surroundings). Finally, the National University Student Survey (Parker 2007) was conducted in 2005 using a representative sample of university students from the twenty-five main universities in Chile.

In these studies we asked secondary and university students, as well as the general population, about their religious self-identification. Unsurprisingly in a Latino and mestizo culture, we found that religious affiliation continues to be a characteristic trait of the cultural identity of the majority of the younger generation. We were able to distinguish between believers (mainly among Catholics) and those who are not affiliated with any ecclesiastic institution by establishing the categories “Catholic in my own way” and “believer without religion,” options that come from the common-sense language analyzed in previous qualitative research. These alternative religious options—present in everyday discourse—augment the traditional categories of “Catholic,” “evangelical,” “nonbeliever,” “atheist,” and so forth. By opening the umbrella of religious options, we can explore the diverse religious identifications and meanings of today’s young people.

Between 25 and 30 percent of the student sample from the secondary schools and universities declare themselves to be simply “Catholic” (Table 4.3). Between 26 and 31 percent of the secondary and university students identify themselves as “Catholics in my own way,” suggesting that they distance themselves from official and ecclesiastical Catholicism. Between 15 and 25 percent of the students identify themselves as “believers without religion,” while only 5 percent of secondary students and 11 to 17 percent of university students identify themselves as either “nonbelievers” or “atheists.”⁸

Although our secondary (1999) and university student (2002) samples are not representative of the entire country, our 2004 survey of the metropolitan region is, which enables us to draw some conclusions with confidence. In our comparison of the national university sample of 2005 with the 2004 survey, we were able to identify some general tendencies. First,

Table 4.3. Religious Self-Identification in Chile, 1999–2005
(in percent)

Type of Believer	Year Age Group	Secondary Students ^a	University Students ^b	Metropolitan Region ^c	University Students ^d
		Sample (Two Regions) (1999)	(One University) (2002)	(Total Population) (2004)	(National) (2005)
		16–20	17–29	18–29 ^e 18–99	17–29
Catholic		29.1	25.8	26.7	30.1
Catholic “in my own way”		31.0	31.5	29.9	25.8
Believer “without religion”		15.1	24.5	21.6	17.1
Evangelical		14.6	4.4	5.5	5.7
Protestant		2.3	0.8	0.6	1.0
Another Religion		2.1	1.9	3.2	2.4
Jewish		0.8	0.4	0.0	0.7
Atheist		2.1	5.7	8.0	6.4
Nonbeliever		3.1	5.0	4.6	10.8

^aSample of schools in Metropolitan Region and Concepción Province, from Secondary Students Survey, 1999 (Parker 2000).

^bRepresentative sample of a main state university in Santiago, from University Sample Survey, 2002 (Parker, Peña, and Barria 2002).

^cRepresentative sample of whole population in the region, from Metropolitan Region Survey, 2004 (Parker and Peña 2005; religious data available from author).

^dRepresentative sample of all students attending the twenty-five main universities in Chile, from National University Student Survey, 2005 (Parker 2007).

^eThis group is a subsample of the general sample.

there are significant differences between secondary and university students, the most substantial being in the categories “atheist” and “nonbeliever,” which are both higher for university students. The sum of these two categories is also greater than the sum of the values for the sample of the population of the metropolitan region as a whole.

In the Fourth National Youth Survey conducted by the government in 2003 (INJUV 2004) ($N = 7,189$), which had another classification for religious affiliation, 23 percent of respondents affirmed that “I do not feel close

to any religion,” but only 4.5 percent declared themselves to be a “non-believer in God or any type of divinity.” In our 2005 National University Student Survey (Parker 2007), of the 17.2 percent of “nonbelievers” and “atheists,” at least 28 percent (4.8 percent of the total) acknowledged believing in God; the proportion of genuine nonbelievers represented only 12.2 percent of the entire sample. The “Catholic” category is higher (37 percent) for the total sample of the metropolitan population than any value in the other sample of youth or student groups. “Believers without religious affiliation” (which is 14 percent for the entire metropolitan population) tends to be higher in the different youth samples: 15 percent for secondary students, and 17 percent for the sample of national university students.

Evidence from the metropolitan region sample (see Table 4.4) suggests that while the “believers without religion” are found mostly among young people, self-identified Catholics are found mostly among their elders. Self-declared “Catholics in my own way” are slightly more prevalent among

Table 4.4. Religious Affiliation by Age in the Santiago Metropolitan Region, 2004

Type of Believer	Age									
	18-29		30-49		50-59		60+		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Agnostic, Atheist	44	12.7	16	6.5	17	6.0	16	5.6	93	8.0
Believer “without religion”	75	21.7	36	14.7	29	10.3	21	7.4	161	13.9
Catholic	93	26.9	74	30.2	117	41.6	148	52.1	432	37.4
Catholic “in my own way”	104	30.1	88	35.9	78	27.8	67	23.6	337	29.2
Evangelical	21	6.1	29	11.8	33	11.7	25	8.8	108	9.3
Other Religion	9	2.6	2	0.8	7	2.5	7	2.5	25	2.2
<i>Total</i>	346		245		281		284		1,156	

Source: Metropolitan Region Survey, Santiago, Chile, 2004 (Parker and Peña 2005).

young and middle-aged adults in the 30- to 49-year-old range (36 percent) and in younger individuals (30 percent) rather than in the older age strata (24 percent). These data are statistically significant ($\text{Chi}^2[10] = 97.63, p = 0.000$).

The general tendency to widen the scope of religious options (and the decline in the number of Catholics) is greater among students and youth. With the exception of the 1999 Secondary Student Survey (due to the type of schools chosen for the sample) this trend cannot be attributed to a higher proportion of evangelicals but rather to the growing number of students with higher education who tend to identify themselves as “believers without a church” or simply as “nonbelievers.” It seems that individuals with a higher level of formal education will tend to opt for more rationalized and noninstitutional forms of beliefs (“in my own way” or “without religion” believers) or for abandoning all references to religion in their life (agnosticism or atheism). The percentage of “believers without religion” should make us pause: if we observe religious affiliation from an institutional point of view according to the distance from the official religion—Catholicism is the predominant religion in Chile—we have a very high percentage of young people whose religious identification points toward an extra-institutional affiliation (or at least to one distant from the mainstream institutions).

In fact, the Metropolitan Region Survey (see Table 4.5) shows that declaring oneself to be “Catholic” means that an individual has a greater degree of confidence in the church and its religious hierarchy—that is, Catholic priests. Asked about their trust in priests, 46 percent of “Catholics” respond they have “much confidence,” while only 26 percent of “Catholics in my own way” respond the same. The distrust is logically greater among agnostics and atheists (67 percent), but interestingly 53 percent of believers that declared themselves to be “without religion” distrust Catholic priests (all data are statistically significant: $\text{Chi}^2(10) = 193.371, p = 0.000$; Pears = 0.06697, $p = 0.029$; Spear = 0.0496, $p = 0.030$) (Parker and Peña 2005). Clearly, “without religion” must be interpreted as a position held by individuals who want to stress dissidence toward the official Catholic Church in a country where this church has a monopoly on the goods of salvation. Indeed, we have observed in other surveys that this type of believer generally acknowledges faith in a Christian God.

Responses from the 2005 National University Student Survey (Parker 2007) are consistent with these general trends (see Table 4.6). In the context of falling rates of trust in the church, 37 percent of “Catholics in my own way” express distrust in the church (versus only 19 percent of those who declared themselves simply “Catholics”). These rates were even higher than the distrust expressed by evangelicals (classic adversaries of Catholics in past decades).⁹ As might be expected, agnostics and atheists exhibited the highest degree of distrust in the Catholic Church—69 and 77 percent, respectively. Consistent with the evidence from the 2005 survey, a high proportion of believers “without religion” (61 percent) exhibit a high level of distrust toward the church.

Returning to the data in Table 4.3, 46 percent of high school students and 43 to 56 percent of university students are either “Catholics in my own way” or “believers without religion.” As we have mentioned, from the point of view of the sociological theory of the religious field (Bourdieu 1971), these data could be interpreted as forms of “religious dissidence” in a nation in which Catholicism is dominant in cultural terms. The data from the 2004 Metropolitan Region Survey move in the same direction: 51 percent of people between 18 and 29 years of age can be classified as “dissidents” from official Catholicism, as can 43 percent of the population as a whole above the age of 18 (Parker and Peña 2005).

Table 4.5. Confidence in Catholic Priests in the Santiago Metropolitan Region, 2004 (in percent)

Type of Believer	Distrust	Some Confidence	Much Confidence	N
Agnostic, Atheist	67.0	26.6	6.4	94
Believer “without religion”	52.8	29.2	18.0	161
Catholic	18.0	36.0	46.0	433
Catholic “in my own way”	26.8	47.2	26.0	339
Evangelical	45.4	44.4	10.2	108
Other Religion	51.9	37.0	11.1	27
Total	32.7	38.4	28.9	1162

Source: Metropolitan Region Survey, Santiago, Chile, 2004 (Parker and Peña 2005).

Table 4.6. Degree of Distrust in Churches among Chilean University Students, 2005

<i>Level of Distrust</i>		<i>Percent of Group</i>	
		<i>Expressing Distrust^a</i>	<i>Percent of Whole Sample</i>
High	Atheist	76.6	6.3
	Agnostic, Nonbeliever	69.4	10.9
	Believer "without religion"	61.3	17.0
Moderate	Other Religion	48.3	3.2
	Catholic "in my own way"	37.3	25.7
Low	Evangelical	26.8	6.7
	Catholic	19.3	30.2
	Mean	41.4	

Source: University Student Survey (Parker 2007).

^aResponses generated from question on confidence in institutions: *How much confidence do you have in: churches (government, parliament, universities, the police, etc.)?* Possible responses were *a lot, some, none*. The percentage responding "none" is represented here.

As in North America, attendance at traditional mainline churches is falling. But this fact does not suggest a lack of religious interest but rather a shift of interest in new directions. In Europe, especially in France, such a shift is manifested in what Lambert (2003) has called the "cultural Christians" or the "Deist Christians." This phenomenon is important in Chile in that it reveals distrust in public institutions, a growing feature of political disengagement and disenchantment among Chilean youth in a society that is rapidly modernizing and integrating into the global economy and society.

Like their European and U.S. counterparts, younger Chileans lack interest in classic civic engagement. They tend to avoid traditional civic insti-

tutions and conventional types of civic activism in growing numbers, and they distance themselves from classical forms of participation that were common among previous generations (Balardini 2000; Lamanna 2003; Parker 2003). Young people in Chile tend to voice their public concern, show their political involvement, and create social capital in new ways and channels, especially in and through new social movements, sports, and religion. In this way they differ from young North Americans and Europeans, who tend to channel their public concerns into leisure and consumption.

Education as a Factor that Influences Religious Options

Modern education is a factor of secularization that reduces religiosity and promotes rational choices and the critique of tradition. In the Chilean data we observe that the educational factor is relevant for changes in religious mentality: to some extent education increases antireligious rationalism, but it also promotes new religious alternatives and spiritual choices. One of the main indicators of the process of modernization in Chile is the country's high rate of literacy. According to the official census, Chile's literacy rate rose from 94.6 to 95.8 percent between 1992 and 2002. Additionally, a very significant increase has taken place in the level of formal education. The 2002 census indicates that the number of children attending preschool almost doubled, and the number of people receiving high school and university education increased from 1,072,198 in 1992 to 2,284,036 in 2002 (INE 2003). In the same period the higher education enrollment rate increased from 9 to 16.4 percent.

In the context of the census data we can analyze religious identification among 15 to 29 year olds nationwide (see Table 4.7). We find that a higher level of formal education produces more people who declare themselves as not having any religion or as atheists or agnostics. Among those with only a primary education, atheists and agnostics represent only 9.5 percent of the total. The percentage increases to 9.9 percent among respondents who reached secondary school and to 15.3 percent among those who had some higher education. If we look now at the census data for the metropolitan region,¹⁰ we find further evidence of this trend among "nonbelievers" and "atheists" (see Table 4.8). Evangelicals, who are more prevalent among the least educated, are significantly influenced by formal

education, but Catholics are not. In addition, as the younger generation increasingly experiences the modern educational system, this tendency is evident in the corresponding data for people between 15 and 29 years old (see Table 4.7). Catholics with less formal education are underrepresented relative to the total Catholic population, and evangelicals are overrepresented relative to their overall numbers. Also, proportionally fewer evangelicals have had access to a university education.

This tendency coincides with the one observed in the Third National Youth Survey (INJUV 2001) and the 1999 Secondary Students Survey (Parker 2000). When the educational factor is cross-tabulated with other variables (such as gender, family income strata, type of school, and so forth), we find that men with higher income levels who attended elite schools are disproportionately Catholic. Women from the lower income strata and from lower-class schools are disproportionately evangelical. Protestants and Jews are slightly better represented among women, among higher-revenue strata, and among those who attended schools for the upper class. "Believers without religion" are also more numerous among women and those educated in schools for the middle and lower classes; and the nonbelievers prevail in middle-class and elite income levels and schools. Atheists are for the most part men from middle- and high-income strata and schools. Alternative religions are preferred by women from lower strata and schools. Finally, those identifying as "Catholic in my own way" prevail among the male youths of middle and high strata and schools.

Table 4.7. Education and Religion among 15 to 29 Year Olds in Chile, 2002 (in percent)

<i>Educational Level</i>	<i>Catholic</i>	<i>Evangelical</i>	<i>Other Religion</i>	<i>None or Atheist</i>
8th Grade or Less	61.8	22.2	6.5	9.5
Secondary School	67.2	15.9	7.0	9.9
Tertiary Education	67.3	8.7	8.6	15.3
<i>Total (mean)</i>	66.2	15.4	7.3	11.1

Source: Chilean National Census 2002 (INE 2003).

Table 4.8. Religion by Educational Level in the Santiago Metropolitan Region, 2002

Educational Level	Catholics		Evangelicals		Other Religion		Atheist, No Religion		Total
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	
Primary (8th grade or less)	814,308	66.8	234,442	19.2	86,905	7.1	83,853	6.9	1,219,508
Secondary (9th-12th grades)	1,468,781	69.6	277,466	13.1	161,951	7.7	202,798	9.6	2,110,996
Technical and University	846,160	69.3	83,265	6.8	106,672	8.7	185,366	15.2	1,221,463
Total	3,129,249	68.7	595,173	13.1	355,528	7.8	472,017	10.4	4,551,967

Source: Chilean National Census, 2002 (INE 2003).

The Metropolitan Region Survey (Parker and Peña 2005), conducted in October 2004 with a representative sample of the region's entire population, allows us to build on these empirical observations and determine their significance with statistical correlations. If we correlate religion with age it is clear (as we observed before) that age is influencing religious options in terms of diminishing Catholicism and increasing "other alternatives," but this is the case mostly among nonbelievers and "believers in my own way." Cramer's correlation test gives significant results. On the other hand, if we correlate religion with educational level, we find a very significant result (see Table 4.9.) In order to avoid the bias of age in the causal relationship between education and religion, we have applied a nominal by nominal Cramer's Correlation test to each age strata with the following results: 18 to 29 years old, $CrV = 0.162$, $p = 0.052$; 30 to 49 years, $CrV = 0.197$, $p = 0.000$; 50 to 59 years, $CrV = 0.173$, $p = 0.410$; more than 60 years old, $CrV = 0.181$, $p = 0.687$.

This means that both the age and education variables are influencing religion. With a nominal by nominal correlation test we verify that education is significantly correlated with religion among 18 to 29 year olds, and even more strongly among 30 to 49 year olds, but not in the other age cohorts (those between 50 and 59 and above 60). In other words, this survey shows us that modern and formal education significantly influences religious choices among the young and middle-aged but not older people. This is very important because of the great changes in educational systems during the last half of the twentieth century. Members of the older generation (those 50 and above) who were able to get an education attended school forty to sixty years ago when cultural and religious options and pedagogical conditions were more traditional and the educational culture had not absorbed the impact of today's mass media and new technologies. The cultural influence of globalization on education and socialization beginning in the 1980s (affecting individuals who are from 20 to 40 years old) is more evident in the younger generation.

The survey evidence permits us to develop the hypothesis for future research that higher levels of education are generating religious changes in Latin America by increasing the alternatives to "orthodox," traditional Catholicism. These rising alternatives are self-descriptive: "Catholic in my

Table 4.9. Religion by Educational Level in the Santiago Metropolitan Region, 2004

Educational Level	Agnostic/ Atheist		Believer "without religion"		Catholic		Catholic "in my own way"		Evangelical		Other Religion		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
8th Grade or Less	5	2.1	28	11.8	106	44.7	60	25.3	34	14.4	4	1.7	237	
Secondary School	29	5.3	73	13.4	204	37.6	165	30.4	57	10.5	15	2.8	543	
Tertiary Education	59	15.2	61	15.7	128	33.0	115	29.6	17	4.4	8	2.1	388	
<i>Total</i>	93	8.0	162	13.9	438	37.5	340	29.1	108	9.3	27	2.3	1,168	

Source: Metropolitan Region Survey (Parker and Peña 2005).

own way”; a “believer without religion,” “agnostic,” or “atheist”; and the nebulous category of “other religions.”

A parallel tendency—and presumably exercising a great impact on religion in Latin America—is that there is an inverse relationship between educational level and the proportion of evangelicals. But does this mean that as educational reforms continue in Latin America and formal education increases among new waves of young people, the religious scene will become even more diversified, and evangelicals will decrease just as did the proportion of faithful Catholics? If we focus on students (17 to 25 year olds), a clear example of an elite in a developing country, we must ask, Is it the sole effect of a higher level of education that produces religious pluralism, or is it the type of education supplied (more diverse, religious or not) that is broadening the scope for religious alternatives?

Let us examine the empirical data we have, first for secondary students and then for university students, and cross-tabulate the type of believer with the type of institution—public (lyceums), private secular, or Catholic (see Table 4.10.) In both wholly private Catholic schools and those in which the state subsidizes tuition for low- and lower-middle-income families, the percentage of Catholics is higher (55 percent) but the difference is not pronounced. Only in one lay, private, upper-class school do we find a higher proportion of Catholics (72 percent). This is probably due to the fact that Catholicism is a cultural trait of the upper classes in Chile and the school we are analyzing is a very typical elite school. In most of the secular or public schools of different social strata we find a higher proportion of “Catholics in my own way”—approximately 63 to 65 percent. This is the case with the lay subsidized private secondary schools and many of the public high schools known as *liceos* (lyceums).¹¹ Lower-class public secondary school students in the Concepción region, 66 percent of whom are Catholic, constitute an exception, probably due to local cultural dynamics. The association of non-Catholic schools (private lay and public) and the greater presence of “Catholic in my own way” students is relevant. In six of the ten non-Catholic schools, this kind of believer constitutes more than 60 percent of self-declared Catholics. The association between Catholic schools and the presence of “Catholics”—that is to say Catholics close to official Catholicism—is important but not as clear as one would expect: only 55 to 56 percent of students in these schools self-identify as Catholics.

Table 4.10. Type of Catholics by Types of Secondary Schools in Chile, 1999
(in percent)

Socioeconomic		No. of Schools	Type of School	Type of Believer	
Level	Region			Catholic	Catholic "in my own way"
Lower	Santiago	2	Public—Lyceum*	35.4	64.6
	Concepción	2	Public—Lyceum*	65.7	34.3
Middle	Santiago	1	Catholic—Private *	55.6	44.4
	Concepción and Santiago	2	Lay—Private*	35.4	64.6
High	Concepción	1	Public—Lyceum*	52.6	47.4
	Santiago	1	Lay—Private Paid**	71.7	28.3
	Concepción and Santiago	2	Lay—Private Paid**	36.9	63.1
	Concepción	1	Catholic—Private Paid**	55.9	44.1

Source: Survey of Secondary Students (Parker 2000).

*These schools are subsidized partially or wholly by the state.

**These schools are wholly private and independent.

This evidence suggests that the general tendency may be for the number of "Catholics in my own way" to increase proportionate to the expansion in private lay or public secondary institutions. Nowadays, the correlation is not absolute and direct: there are important exceptions (private lay schools with a higher percentage of Catholics; public lyceums with more Catholics), but these exceptions are due to local culture and/or to class-specific cultural variables that are conditioning this phenomenon. Even in Catholic schools cultural values are a very important influence that generate "in my own way" believers (at least 44 percent), which implies that whether or not a school is Catholic, although relevant, is not the exclusive factor conditioning the religious consciousness of secondary school students.

Does the type of educational institution have a similar impact on the religious affiliation of university students? Are university students educated

in lay institutions more likely to be Catholics “in their own way” or believers without religious affiliation than students educated in traditional Catholic institutions? Our 2005 National University Student Survey (Parker 2007) reveals that Catholic institutions do tend to “produce” (that is, generate the favorable conditions for the social production of) “plain” Catholics—that is, persons of faith who indeed identify with their church—but not a proportionately high number of them (see Table 4.11). The Catholic university, as a “confessional institution,”¹² has as its main purpose promoting faith and religious adhesion to “straight” catechismal teachings and morals. The fact that 50 percent of the students are “in my own way believers” rather than “Catholics” (38 percent) means that this type of university is in fact generating a more pluralistic education.

On the other hand, secular universities generate a social space where we find the social conditions more likely to produce alternatives to Catholicism, such as believers “in my own way,” adherents of other religions, and atheists. In particular, a variety of lay institutions are increasing the ranks of adherents to other faiths (Protestants, including Pentecostals, Mormons, Jews, etc.) and believers “in my own way.” Traditional secular institutions (some of them state universities, some private universities promoted by lay movements such as the Masons), which originated as alternatives to confessional institutions and often with an anticlerical stance, are not generating the social conditions for atheism. Rather, they are stimulating religious alternatives to Catholicism.

Table 4.11. Religious Affiliation by Type of University in Chile, 2005
(in percent)

<i>Type of University</i>	<i>Atheist</i>	<i>“In my own way” believer^a</i>	<i>Catholic</i>	<i>Other Religion</i>
Lay	7.04	55.0	26.8	11.2
Catholic	4.7	50.1	38.4	6.8

Source: National University Student Survey (Parker 2007).

^aThis category is the sum of the “Catholics in my own way” and “believer without religion” categories.

In recent years new institutions have appeared. Indeed, the privatization of the educational system and the introduction of educational reforms have created more diverse types of private schools and universities. Some of these are Protestant colleges and universities, which were practically nonexistent in Latin America during the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries. In some countries even Catholic universities did not exist in the nineteenth century: given the *patronato* regime (the special accord between the state and the Vatican), public national universities included departments of (Catholic) theology, helping give rise to the notion of the “Catholic continent.”

But let us take a closer look at what is happening with those self-identified Catholics who want to distance themselves from their church—the “Catholics in my own way.” As the National University Student Survey shows, whereas in lay universities the difference between “Catholics” and “Catholics in my own way” is insignificant (26.8 percent vs. 25.5 percent, respectively), in Catholic universities substantially more students self-identify as “Catholic” (38.4 percent) than as “Catholic in my own way” (26 percent) (Parker 2007).

If the type of institution at the tertiary level (confessional or not) does not explain how “in my own way” Catholics are produced, then the emergence of this religious identification—which, as we have seen, indicates distrust in the institutional church—must be attributable to other social factors. Our hypothesis is that the general exposure to a more liberal and critical culture within circles of highly educated elites (such as the university students studied) affords the opportunity to question traditional religious identification. The “Enlightenment” culture in this case does not produce secularization (understood as a dissipating of faith) but rather self-styled forms of believing and classical critiques of the concept of authority.

Educational Change in Latin America: More Religious Changes in the Future?

Beginning in the 1980s (and picking up steam in the 1990s), educational reforms have been transforming educational systems in Latin

America.¹³ Educational reforms backed by the World Bank and other international organizations have followed the neoliberal prescriptions that began with Margaret Thatcher's educational reforms in Britain. These policies reduced government financial support to educational institutions, introduced accountability for the use of public funds, and required educational institutions to turn to the market as the main factor shaping their future.

Structural adjustment measures were undertaken by Latin American countries in the 1980s and 1990s in order to stabilize the economy, liberalize trade, and become integrated into the global market. Great efforts were also made to advance educational reforms in all sectors. Programs to increase primary and secondary education coverage and quality have been implemented all over the region in the past fifteen years. In the ten years from 1994 to 2004, when World Bank lending for tertiary education averaged US\$343 million per year, Latin America and the Caribbean received the largest share (33 percent) of bank lending for tertiary education, followed by East Asia and the Pacific (29 percent) and South Asia (15 percent).

In its support for the actual implementation of higher educational reforms, the World Bank gives priority to programs and projects that focus on increasing institutional diversification; establishing sustainable financing systems to encourage responsiveness and flexibility; strengthening management capacities; improving the quality and relevance of tertiary education; and supporting research and development capacity. It also promotes programs aimed at achieving greater equity by assisting disadvantaged students. In recent decades there has been an impressive growth of enrollments, "together with the multiplication of universities, creating greater institutional differentiation and increasing regionalization and privatization" (Torres and Schugurensky 2004, 37).

The main result of these reforms has been educational pluralization. For decades the developmentalist or populist states in Latin America were in charge of education. Many countries were proud of their public schools and universities. But the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s affected educational systems, and their recovery began with the implementation of neoliberal reforms and structural readjustment measures that reduced public funding for social policy, including education, and promoted different ways of financing private investment in this area (CTERA et al. 2005). The presence of the private sector in the field has been growing to different degrees in

different countries. In general, private education today is represented by a larger percentage of institutions of higher learning than of primary and secondary schools (González 2002).

The state continues to support the educational system but the door is clearly open to the private sector and for different types of private-public combinations. More private corporations and enterprises are committed (totally or partially) to financing, administering, and promoting private schools. This privatization of education stems from the interest of the private sector in skilled labor and its perception that education is a lucrative business. Private investment in education has also been supported by increased public subsidies and tax breaks.

Whereas Catholic institutions were traditionally the main components of the private educational sector, today there is a growing presence of Protestant and secular institutions. Even within Catholicism there is increasing diversification because liberal educational norms allow for the implementation of different educational programs coming out of different dioceses, Catholic congregations, and lay movements. The direct consequence of these developments in terms of religion is primarily that private education is ceasing to be a monopoly of traditional Catholicism.

The data we have marshaled in the preceding section, however, suggests that the type of educational institution that students attend is not the most important source of religious change. Religious pluralism increases not only because the number of Catholic schools and universities are declining, their influence is reduced, or there are fewer “religious classes” in the schools. Rather, religious pluralism is growing because of the population’s increased symbolic production of diverse forms of religious beliefs and types of spiritual searching that are often distrustful of religious institutions. And, in turn, the increase in the educational levels is affecting positively the social conditions that produce these diverse religious alternatives. We refer here to the general impact of education on religious consciousness, not to explicit religious teaching or catechism received in “religious classes” in public or confessional establishments.

Since colonial times—following the Christendom model—religious instruction in public educational institutions was the norm. In fact, during the nineteenth century most governments continued to depend on the church to provide education, and secular public schools only appeared with

the reforms pushed through by liberal governments in the second half of the nineteenth century. In many countries, however, in spite of the separation of church and state, religious teaching continued to be a Catholic monopoly, even in public schools. In Mexico (Loaeza 2003) the Catholic order essentially underpinned the authoritarian regime, even though the regime was allegedly anticlerical. This picture shifted in the second half of the twentieth century, and “religion classes” are now optional or elective (depending on the student’s professed confession) in many public educational systems in Latin America. This transformation of religious instruction in schools toward the end of the twentieth century coincided with the above-mentioned educational reforms that tend to diversify educational offerings, thus considerably reducing the reach and influence of confessional education.

These changes took place in the context of the diminishment of traditional family religious socialization (see Loaeza, chap. 3 in this volume). Especially against the backdrop of the diminishing importance of the extended family vis-à-vis the nuclear family in today’s Latin American societies, the role of grandparents has been transformed. Whereas traditionally Latin American children received their religious socialization at home from their grandmothers, today, with the breakdown of the extended family, children and youth are much more exposed to the messages coming from school, television, and the Internet.

If explicit religious teaching in school is a secondary factor that brings about religious pluralism, and traditional family religious socialization is diminishing, then our attention must focus on the general educational changes in the region and to what has happened, in general terms, with formal education and its influence on the Latin American masses. The general level of education of the Latin American population has increased systematically in the past two decades. The illiteracy rate is now much lower—in 2000 only 12 percent of the population aged 15 and above was illiterate, compared to 18.5 percent in 1980 (ECLAC 1999). In 2004 only 4 percent of youth aged 15 to 24 were illiterate (the world average was 12 percent) and the gender parity index was 1.01 (UNESCO 2005, 132). Moreover, enrollments in primary, secondary, and tertiary schools have all increased as well. On average for all Latin American countries, enrollment in primary schools has increased from 85 percent in 1980 to 94 percent in 2000 and enrollment

in secondary schools has increased from 38 percent in 1980 to 60 percent in 2003. The current rate of primary education enrollment (above 95 percent) is similar to that registered in developed countries.

In comparative terms educational changes in Latin America have been clear and vigorous. As we can observe in Table 4.12, information provided by the World Education Indicators (WEI) program (a joint UNESCO Institute for Statistics [UIS] and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] project) for 2002–2003 permits us to compare the progress of Latin American countries participating in this program (Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay) with the mean of all countries that participate in the project, including some African, Asian (WEI mean), and OECD countries (OECD mean). The table clearly illustrates that the annual growth rate in enrollment (2.94 percent) is higher for Latin American countries as a whole than for the WEI countries (2.08 percent) and the OECD countries (0.65 percent). It continues to be high for primary (0.68 percent) and for secondary education (4.74 vs. 3.04 for all WEI and 0.26 for all OECD countries). Only in tertiary education is the rate of enrollment growth in Latin American countries surpassed by other developing and developed countries (the sample included China, India, and Russia).

Table 4.12. Average Annual Growth Rate of Enrollment at Different Levels of Education, 1995–2003

	<i>Latin America WEI</i>	<i>WEI Mean</i>	<i>OECD Mean</i>
Total	2.94	2.08	0.65
Preprimary	3.80	3.90	0.75
Primary	0.68	-0.01	0.23
Lower Secondary	3.90	2.28	-0.28
Upper Secondary	6.04	4.32	0.24
All Secondary	4.74	3.04	0.26
Tertiary ^a	5.54	n.d.	-0.85
Tertiary and Advanced Research Programs	3.46	9.80	4.15
All Tertiary	4.70	7.64	4.16

Source: World Education Indicators (UIS-OECD 2005).

^aWEI mean for tertiary level not available.

Table 4.13 shows the 2004 net school enrollment by age of children between the ages of 7 and 17 years old for MERCOSUR (*Mercado Común del Sur, or the Southern Common Market*) members (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay) and an associated member country (Chile).¹⁴ The schooling rates for secondary and especially for higher education continue to be lower in Latin America than in the more economically developed countries. Nonetheless, according to Muñoz and Márquez Jiménez (2000), at the end of the twentieth century these differences between Latin America and the developed countries were narrowing (57.2 versus 100 percent in secondary education, and 18.4 versus 50.5 percent in higher education, for the 1998–1999 period).

According to recent data on the gross and net enrollment ratios for secondary education in Latin America furnished by UNESCO, there are evident differences among countries (see Table 4.14). By 2002–2003, whereas the net enrollment ratio of Cuba, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil had exceeded 75 percent, that of Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua was less than 40 percent. But the gap between South America and the United States is becoming smaller. In 1998–1999 the net enrollment ratio for South America was 62 percent, while in the United States it was 88 percent. By 2002–2003 (the last years for which data are available) this rate had reached 71 percent in South America while remaining stationary in the United States at 88 percent. This increase of 9 percent between 1998 and 2003 is

Table 4.13. Net Enrollment by Age, 2004
(in percent)

Country	Age	
	7–14	15–17
Argentina	104.3	79.8
Brazil	97.0	80.6
Chile	95.6	89.2
Paraguay	96.1	64.7
Uruguay	100.9	76.3

Source: MERCOSUR (2004).

larger than the mean for all of the Latin American countries, which moved from 53.5 percent in 1998–1999 to 60.1 percent in 2002–2003, an increase of 6.64 percentage points.

The expansion of education to a greater segment of the population is not without problems. Educational coverage has expanded in the last thirty years, but educational quality has not kept pace: the teaching of language, mathematics, and the sciences is weak even in many of the most advanced

Table 4.14. Secondary Education in Latin America, 1998–1999 and 2002–2003

	1998–1999		2002–2003	
	Gross Enrollment Ratio	Net Enrollment Ratio	Gross Enrollment Ratio	Net Enrollment Ratio
Argentina	89	74	100	81
Bolivia	72	n.d.	86	71
Brazil	n.d.	n.d.	110	75
Chile	80	70	89	79
Colombia	71	54	71	55
Costa Rica	57	49	66	53
Cuba	79	75	93	86
Dominican Republic	56	40	59	36
Ecuador	56	46	59	50
El Salvador	50	40	59	49
Guatemala	31	21	43	30
Mexico	69	55	79	63
Nicaragua	48	n.d.	61	39
Panama	68	60	71	63
Paraguay	51	42	65	51
Peru	82	62	90	69
Uruguay	88	66	106	73
Venezuela	57	48	70	59
United States	95	88	94	88
North America ^a	81	71	84	74
South America	85	62	97	71

Source: UIS (2005); author's calculations.

Note: No data (n.d.) available for some countries.

^aIncludes Canada, the United States, and Mexico.

countries of the region. Access to education is still unequal. Opportunities to access secondary education and especially higher education continue to be strongly concentrated in the upper-income groups (Muñoz and Márquez Jiménez 2000).

Notwithstanding the lack of equity and quality, the rising levels of education in Latin America in the last thirty years have had an impact on the growth of Protestants (especially Pentecostals) among the lower classes. As we have seen in the Chilean case, all the evidence points to the fact that higher levels of formal education produce fewer evangelicals. It is well known that lower levels of formal education and especially illiteracy are generally associated with poverty. Similarly, among lower social strata with low levels of formal education, as levels of education rise, the rate at which people join evangelical and especially Pentecostal churches—those often found in this social milieu—falls.

As for tertiary education, in 1950 only one country had 10 percent of the population between 19 and 22 years of age attending institutions of higher learning; in a second, 8 percent were; in most countries, less than 4 percent of the population had had any higher education. In 1997 the rate of enrollment in higher education had reached 22 percent in Latin America. By 2002–2003 the gross rate of enrollment of university and other post-secondary students in fifteen selected countries had reached 30 percent, still far from the U.S. rate of 83 percent but certainly much higher than even the 1998 rate of 24 percent. Overall, the number of undergraduate students rose sharply from 270,000 in the 1950s to almost 10 million by the year 2000. Higher education has become a mass phenomenon in Latin America (C. Rama 2002).

Educational reforms have had a great impact on tertiary education: the alternatives have multiplied with the expanded capacity of the education supply brought about by the increasing number of private universities supplementing the traditional public system. In light of the growing demand for higher education, national and regional governments, and a considerable number of private initiatives, have responded with diverse institutional offerings (Burbano López 1999).

The number of higher educational institutions in the entire region rose from 75 (mostly universities) in 1950 to around 6,000 diverse tertiary institutions in the mid-1990s. By 1994 there were more than 800 universities,

approximately 60 percent of which were in the private sector. The number of other tertiary institutions rose from “a few units” to more than 4,000, of which the preponderance were private, “lucrative types of institutions” (Tünnermann 1997, 99). This trend continued into the next decade. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the massive institutional expansion and diversification of education had produced more than 8,000 institutions of higher learning in the region, compared with the few that had existed just decades earlier. Today the region’s universities, institutes, polytechnic schools, public and private professional colleges, and for-profit and non-profit institutions present an extremely diverse educational landscape. According to UNESCO data for 2002–2003, over half (53.5 percent) of students in a sample of Latin American countries enrolled in tertiary educational institutions attended public institutions, as compared to 76.3 percent in the OECD countries and 74.7 percent in a sample of Asian and African countries. The mean proportion of students enrolled in government-dependent private institutions in Latin America (42 percent) was much higher than the mean for the OECD countries (12 percent) and the developing countries of Asia and Africa (32 percent) (UIS 2005).¹⁵

The diversity in the tertiary educational system in Latin America extends beyond the nature of the institutions of higher learning. The ownership and cultural and ideological orientation of private schools and universities is nowadays much more pluralistic than it was in the middle of the twentieth century. Some churches, especially the Catholic Church, have increased their presence, but other, mainly Protestant and evangelical, churches have also recently begun to develop activities in this domain.

Catholic institutions themselves are becoming more diverse. In addition to universities supported by the Vatican, the National Bishops’ Conferences, and even some dioceses, a number of universities have also been founded by different religious orders and lay movements covering the entire spectrum, from the very conservative Legionaries of Christ and Opus Dei to the very progressive Jesuits and Dominicans, as well as other religious orders such as the Salesians and Franciscans and doctrinal and ideological religious groups. Options in higher education are multiplying beyond confessional institutions. Indeed, since the 1980s many universities have been founded by private companies and ideological groups such as the Masons.¹⁶

I believe there are a number of outstanding factors influencing religious options that can be generalized to all Latin American countries, as explained in the following hypotheses¹⁷:

- a) *The deficiencies in education that are evident in many respects in the region have not been and will not prove to be obstacles to modern schools influencing the culture of new generations with the codes and values of modernity.* Culture has had a decisive impact on religious beliefs and practices since, as we have suggested, education has significantly opened up religious options, all the more among young people.
- b) *The pluralization of public and private options in the local educational system not only creates alternatives to the classical confessional school but also questions the classic model of confessional schools.* The reproduction of religious beliefs and morals no longer depends exclusively on classic family socialization patterns or exposure to traditional catechism and religious instruction in school.
- c) *Contemporary educational content and pedagogy that tends to elevate the autonomy of the subject being educated¹⁸ breed a critical attitude and skepticism toward received narratives, in addition to the critical spirit already stimulated by today's scientific spirit and method.* In the formal socialization process there is space for creativity, which in religious and spiritual matters undoubtedly prompts the young to distance themselves from conventional preaching, catechetical practices, and the old-fashioned presentation of church dogmas and doctrine.
- d) *If there is indeed an inverse correlation between the number of evangelicals and levels of education, if this tendency is generalizable to different cultural and educational contexts across Latin America, and if with modernization and globalization educational levels continue to show improvement throughout the region, then we may have reached a ceiling in the continued growth of evangelicalism (mostly of Pentecostal inspiration).*
- e) *Lastly, if the observed tendency for more highly educated Catholics to identify as believing "in my own way," and this type of religious option has significant interaction with other "nonorthodox" and nonconventional beliefs and practices ("believers without religion," New Age spirituality, and new popular syncretic practices), and if we can expect educa-*

tional levels to improve throughout Latin America, then we should witness an increase in religious pluralization in and through the expansion of nonconventional beliefs and practices.

Unquestionably, the changes within churches, which follow from the specific historical dynamics of Catholicism and evangelical denominations, are key to understanding transformations in the field of religion. Another notable source of change is the religious competition among churches. Finally, notwithstanding the weakening of Catholic hegemony from without by evangelical and missionary churches, which many see as “besieging the church,” Catholic hegemony is also being “tunneled out” by new cultural patterns reproduced in socialization and pedagogical processes in modern schools and universities. Most importantly, educational reforms are undermining Catholic hegemony. For the great majority of Latin America’s youth, who are raised in Catholic families, the access to school and to higher levels of formal education—in the context of the new educational conditions—encourages them to search for new religious beliefs, distrust traditional religious authorities, and accept alternative, sometimes syncretic and “self-styled,” ways of believing.

Responses to the 2005 National University Student Survey (Parker 2007) illustrate in particularly dramatic fashion the birth of different types of syncretic beliefs drawn from East Asian and local folk traditions. When asked about heterodox beliefs, more than half of the students in the sample responded that they believed in one or more of the following: black magic, witches, spirits, reincarnation, astrology, aliens, and traditional shamans (Table 4.15). Cluster analysis allowed us to construct a typology: those who believe in supernatural or mysterious realities (Cluster 1) and those who do not believe (Cluster 2). The cross-tabulation with the type of believer reveals that believers “in my own way” and “without religion” tend to hold heterodox beliefs.¹⁹

Empirical data provided by the 2003 Chilean National Youth Survey (INJUV 2004) for young people (sixteen to twenty-nine years old) who have thirteen or more years of formal education (including at least one year of tertiary education) confirm that people with this level of education tend to hold syncretic beliefs: 54 percent acknowledge believing in an assortment of concepts, including astrology, reincarnation, aliens, “self knowledge,”

Table 4.15. Heterodox Beliefs among University Students in Chile, 2005

<i>Type of Believer</i>	<i>Believes (Cluster 1)</i>	<i>Does Not Believe (Cluster 2)</i>
Atheist	27.2	72.8
Agnostic, nonbeliever	38.4	61.6
Believer "without religion"	62.4	37.6
Catholic "in my own way"	63.4	36.6
Catholic	56.8	44.0
Evangelical	47.9	52.1
Other Religion	41.6	58.4
Mean	54.5	45.5

Source: National University Student Survey (Parker 2007).

Note: Based on responses (affirmative and negative) to question, "Do you believe in black magic, witches, spirits, reincarnation, astrology, aliens, and shamans?" Clusters represent groups of believers and nonbelievers in these supernatural entities.

and magic. All those surveyed had a Christian background. The general observed tendency holds even for Catholics—50 percent hold heterodox beliefs. Furthermore, 59 percent of those declaring "I don't feel close to any religion" (33 of the total in this survey) adhere to this type of heterogeneous belief.

Indeed, Catholics are setting out on an internal path toward dissidence when they declare themselves to be Catholic "in my own way"; but the path to dissidence stretches even further when they switch to other churches or when they join the group of "believers without religion" (mostly nominal Catholics still considering themselves to be believers in God and Jesus Christ but not part of the Catholic Church). This type of belief constitutes a form of dissidence from Catholic orthodoxy because in their syncretic views the faithful blend some theological truths and official dogma (believing in God, Jesus Christ, and even the Virgin Mary) with a variety of popular or folk beliefs (traditional shamanism, healing, black magic, and so forth) and "postmodern" beliefs (astrology, witchcraft, aliens, and other types of occultist or New Age components). These self-styled believers combine a variety of different religious or traditional beliefs into a unique fusion that suits their particular experience and context. In other words,

while atheism is growing slowly, the faithful whose beliefs are “diffuse” and who only nominally recognize their affiliation to Catholicism are growing more palpably. Meanwhile, popular Catholicism, with all its syncretism and heterodoxy, continues to make inroads even among the better educated and urban elite.

In all these new religious expressions the changing pattern of global culture is made manifest. The development of beliefs and rituals is being influenced and made possible by the new technologies of information and communication that are ever more available to the more educated younger generation. In this context horizontal and decentralized networks that represent a growing resistance to hierarchical authority are proliferating. New real and virtual rituals and supernatural realities are born and entire world-views are transformed. It is within this religious diversity that individuals search for alternative answers to institutionalized and rationalized religions and promote syncretism and pluralism. Multiple affiliations, interactions among religions, the neo-magic (hermetic and magico-ritual mysticism), all the Pentecostals (Catholic or evangelical), ethnic shamanism, and varied popular religions and new spiritualities coexist and develop within this complex (often called “postmodern”) panorama. Formal educational changes are altering the cultural patterns where religious shifts are taking place. Sometimes higher levels of education promote religious pluralism directly; at other times, educational changes generate new conditions conducive to the blossoming of religious diversity.

I have based my analysis and interpretation mostly on evidence from the Chilean case; therefore, generalizations should be made with caution. I have underscored the impact of educational changes that create favorable conditions for the acceptance of the global cultural marketplace that is driving religious and cultural change. If other Latin American countries follow the Chilean model of reform, they, too, will undoubtedly experience these global cultural factors. Indeed, experts consider Chilean educational reform a model that is being followed by many countries in the region. Torres and Schugurensky, who analyze university restructuring in comparative perspective, conclude that in Latin America this process “is following a model of privatization probably most advanced in Chile, where the 1981 reform . . . can be interpreted as the reverse of the Argentinean 1918 university reform” (2004, 38).²⁰ Nevertheless, as can well be imagined, each

country has its own local cultural and religious history and traditions that can develop the general tendency toward religious pluralization in many different but specific directions.

What we have learned from the Chilean case in particular is that there is a positive and complex (while not necessarily direct and causal) relation between the increase in educational opportunities and the diversification of educational systems, on the one hand, and the increase in religious pluralism in the mentality of young people, on the other hand. This general tendency permits us to predict, as a working hypothesis, that if general sociological and historical conditions evolve along similar lines in the different countries, the changing religious panorama of Latin American countries will continue to become more pluralistic. Catholicism will remain the main religious option for most Latin Americans for many years to come; however, Catholicism itself will be increasingly challenged by diverse religious alternatives (often heterodox beliefs) even among its own adherents.

Conclusion: Religious Pluralism as Political Pluralism?

In highly developed societies, especially in Europe (and to a notably lesser extent in the United States), Weber's observation in the early twentieth century rings true: "the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely mundane passions, which often actually give it the character of sport" (Weber 1958, 182).

Our study of Chile suggests that along with economic growth and socioeconomic prosperity in recent decades, a consumer society has changed the lives of the people. But contrary to Weberian expectations, religious expressions have not vanished. Rather, they have become diversified and are still a source of meaning for the people. Because the country's religious roots are Catholic rather than Protestant, religious beliefs have spread neither asceticism nor the idea of "the calling" (or the Protestant work ethic and the spirit of capital accumulation) in this cultural context. But because the process of secularization was not tightly connected to and did not follow directly from economic compulsion, as it did for Weber, the secularized idea of fulfillment of the calling has been replaced by the hedonistic

spirit of consumerism, without need of any justification. Thus, religious beliefs have been developed in a parallel world to everyday economic life. The transformation of the system toward a postmodern culture has guaranteed the renewal of ancient values in new conditions, akin to what Debray called “postmodern archaism” (1996).

According to Weber, rationality was supposed to engender antireligious attitudes or at least diminish religion’s great influence. In contrast, what we have observed in this chapter is that, at least in the Latin American context, rationality brings new religious expression and spirituality. Thus, rationality and spiritualism can coexist. What has happened here to create this situation, and why are these findings important? Weber believed that the mechanical nature of industrial capitalism would inevitably impact society’s worldview and expel all religious meaning. But he was also aware of the possibility of change created by historical processes. He once wrote, “No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development, entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance” (Weber 1958, 182).

What Weber did not or could not have imagined was the new technological information and communication revolution of the last half of the twentieth century. The new globalized capitalism is not based on mechanical forms of production but rather on technotronic forms that stress symbolic and virtual realities. New religious expressions have been nurtured by educational transformation in a society that has been exposed to a radical cultural change: the culture of images and symbols and a new consumer society in which all sorts of electronic devices pervade everyday life. There is no longer a risk of Weber’s “mechanized petrification” of social meaning. Instead, the risk is the chaotic multiplication of “new prophets” and an excessive diversification of all sorts of “ideas and ideals.”

In the context of Latin culture, educational transformation—the increase of educational levels and access to institutions of higher education, changes in pedagogy and the reform of traditional patterns, and the opening to new technologies and science—leads to the autonomy of a “postmodern” Latin subject who searches “in her own way” for new modes of believing. Educational change also explains why education and rationality

generate distrust of religious institutions (and dogma) but not religion and religious belief itself. If we expect educational levels to improve throughout Latin America, then we should also anticipate not merely the spread of the classic, secular Enlightenment mentality but also that of nonconventional (“postmodern”) beliefs and practices.

The new religious panorama in Latin America, taking into account the particularities of each country and region, is evidence of a decline of Catholicism and a consequent diminishing of the cultural and political influence of the Catholic Church. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this change does not mean that we are facing a “Protestant continent” or secularization. Rather, we are confronted with a complex process in which the marked tendency is toward a constant increase in religious pluralism—the result of ongoing educational change—but the presence of a Catholic Church that continues to maintain certain symbolic (and sometimes even political) privileges as the once “official religion” of Latin American societies is maintained.

Much of the existing religious diversity is expressed in such examples as the devotion to the Virgin of Guadalupe; Umbanda, Candomblé, Santería, and Spiritism; “Pare de Sufrir”; televangelism; “Prosperity Theology”; Pentecostalism; and Father Rossi, Mother Angelica, and the popular “saints”²¹—Sarita Colonia (Peru), Romualdito (Chile), María Lionza (Venezuela), and the Difunta Correa (Argentina), to mention some of the most famous. Some of these religious manifestations come under the umbrella of a Catholicism that is nominally “Roman Catholic” but is often referred to as “Popular Catholicism,” while others are clear expressions of new religious movements or cults. Many of them are—in the minds of the faithful—just different ways of constructing or reconstructing their own self-styled religious meaning. Higher levels of formal education do not threaten these types of cults, but education is transforming the ways in which meaning is produced: the faithful reconstruct (and reform) in their own minds and in their own way the official and conventional meaning these realities have had for institutional churches or cults or for the traditional popular worldview. Younger believers are distancing themselves from long-established official or popular beliefs and rituals and creating new types of syncretic beliefs in a style that combines many symbolic elements from different traditions. Indeed, the symbolic goods offered by consumer society are more

diverse and alluring than ever before. However, diversity has always been part of the spiritual landscape, and people have always built their personal religious convictions and beliefs in the intimacy of their hearts, with creativity and the symbolic raw materials (codes, traditions, patterns, signs, and languages) they find close at hand: “What is different today is that the traditional Christian churches have lost the power to impose their ‘orthodoxy’ and to suppress those ‘heterodoxies’ of people” (D. Smith 2001).

The impact produced by the plurality of religious choices as well as changes in religious mentality does not necessarily point to certain political views or involvements. We must remember that the field of religion has a much more complex and indirect (certainly not direct or casual) relationship with the field of politics. Therefore, it follows that we cannot deduce a direct increase in political pluralism from the increase in religious pluralism. Rather, we need to examine each national case in order to determine the relationship between religion and politics. Although general cultural tendencies may impact religious change across national borders, when we speak of politics we must take into consideration the changing conditions of specific conjunctural and institutional dynamics in each country (see Hagopian, chap. 1 in this volume).

The capacity of the Catholic Church to influence politics depends on many factors, including the church’s relationship with the state, its own institutional strength, and its relationship with civil society. In democratic contexts pluralist religious options have different forms of expression, which diminish the impact of moral and social messages of the hierarchy, who are constrained by that plural base. The church can participate in public debates but will not always have a decisive influence in political decisions and outputs—even *vis-à-vis* Catholic politicians. The capacity for mobilizing civil society will depend on grassroots organization generated in parishes, base communities, lay movements, and other initiatives inspired by Christianity, but it will be more likely motivated by secular social and political interests inspired by moral doctrine rather than by direct religious expression of beliefs, rituals, and faith.

The reality is that these societies are now dealing with a weaker Catholic Church in cultural and political terms. This fact will certainly shape twenty-first-century societies. The Catholic Church, which provided stability and social cohesion in the context of the political cycles of instability in the

twentieth century, may not be able to perform this role in the future as it did in the past. This transformation of the Latin American religious scene—that is, the declining influence of Catholicism and the increase of religious pluralism—is a challenge for sociologists and political scientists inasmuch as they have to analyze and evaluate these changes in terms of the costs and benefits for the development of democracy (McCarthy 1993). Growing religious pluralism could be a sign of democracy's advance, but only to the extent that different religious currents promote an ecumenical attitude of tolerance—including tolerance for heterodoxies—and so long as they do not fall captive to fundamentalist perspectives.

Notes

This chapter is a revised and updated version of a paper presented at the conference Contemporary Catholicism, Religious Pluralism, and Democracy in Latin America: Challenges, Responses, and Impact held at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, March 31–April 1, 2005. The author uses empirical data from previous research he has conducted in Chile, especially the FONDECYT No. 104261 Research Project, “Scientific and Political Collective Representations of University Students in Chile,” conducted from 2004 to 2006, in which the author was the principal investigator.

1. For the historical context see Dussel (1972, 1985) and Prien (1985).

2. Latin America as a region cannot be historically considered fully “Catholic” because a mixture of religious beliefs and practices coexisted, among them Catholic, indigenous, Afroamerican, and even an Old World popular religion that the Tridentine reformers wished to abolish. Nonetheless, the Catholic Church from the Conquest on was dominant and exercised a Catholic hegemony over culture and civic and political life. The church's authority and orthodoxy was often challenged, and popular religion was always dynamic and syncretizing with native and African religions. Nonetheless, the church at no time was confronted by the scope and nature of challenges that have arisen from the new religiously pluralist panorama.

3. “Superstition” and “neopagan” are charged concepts used by churches to denigrate or disqualify these religious expressions.

4. Many authors have analyzed the historical confrontation of the Catholic Church and authoritarian regimes in Latin America; Christianity and revolutionary movements; and liberation theology, the church, and politics from the 1960s to the 1990s. Among them see Klaiber (1999); Mignone (1999); Sigmund (1999);

Pierucci and Prandi (1996); Sonería (1996); Oxhorn (1995); Romero (1989); Maduro (1987); Mainwaring (1986); De Roux (1983); Muratorio (1982); Richard and Meléndez (1982); IEPALA (1982); Levine (1981a, 1981b); Lalive (1975); and Landsberger (1970).

5. In this chapter I use “religious field” as developed in the theory of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1971). The religious field is a complex phenomenon: it refers to the set of religious actors (priests, religious, lay people, magicians, etc., as well as institutions) that interact in a dynamic and competitive division of religious labor for the social production of religious meaning.

6. About the growth of Pentecostals and other religions in Latin America, see Sanpedro (1986); Lagos (1987); Martínez (1989); Martin (1990); Stoll (1990); Canales, Palma, and Villeda (1991); Cleary and Stewart-Gambino (1992); Marostica (1994); Mariz (1995); B. Gutiérrez (1995); T. Gutiérrez (1996); Freston (1994, 1998); Oro (1999); Carozzi (1999); Frigerio (1999); Masferrer (2000); Barrera (2001); Mafra (2001); and Guerreiro (2003).

7. The five surveys are Popular Religion Survey, 1998 (Parker 1999); Secondary Students Survey, 1999 (Parker 2000); University Sample Survey, 2002 (Parker, Peña, and Barria 2002); Metropolitan Region Survey, 2004 (Parker and Peña 2005; religious data available from author); and National University Students Survey, 2005 (Parker 2007).

8. For our quota sample of secondary students, we looked for a comparative database with a high expression of religious diversity within schools and *municipalidades* (counties) from the Metropolitan Region and Concepción. In this sample 60 percent of the students identify themselves as Catholic. According to the National Youth Survey of 1997 (INJUV 1999), among those that completed secondary education, 70.9 percent were Catholic, 19.2 percent evangelical, 6 percent “no religion,” and 3.4 percent “other religion.”

9. This cross-tabulation is statistically significant: Pears = 0.0084, $p = 0.013$.

10. The Metropolitan Region refers to the city of Santiago and all its municipalities, a total of 6,038,947 inhabitants (INE 2003). The religious affiliation data comes from people 15 years old or older.

11. Lyceum are Chilean public secondary schools in the European tradition developed in the nineteenth century. Currently the lyceum—public high schools—are totally subsidized by the state and run by the local town governments (municipalities). Many of them are attended by the lower classes, but a few are excellent elite public high schools attended by upper-middle-class or upper-class students.

12. In Spanish, *instituciones confesionales* refer to schools (or universities) that are run by a religious institution and that follow a religious orientation and philosophy (Catholic, Protestant, or evangelical vs. lay or public).

13. See G. Rama (1994); Braslavsky (1995); Puiggrós (1999); Rodríguez Gómez (2001); Álvarez Gallego (2001); Arellano Marín (2002); Ricci (2003); CTERA et al. (2005).

14. The secondary school gross enrollment ratio (GER) is the total secondary school enrollment (both sexes), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the secondary school-age population. GER values can be over 100 percent due to the inclusion of overage and underage students in enrollment statistics. Ratios of 100 percent or more indicate that a country is, in principle, able to accommodate all of its school-age population (that is, it has a high educational capacity). When net (age-based) enrollment data are not available, GER data can be used as a substitute indicator to express general levels of participation in education. The difference between GER and net enrollment values estimates the extent of overage and underage enrollment.

GER is calculated by dividing the number of students enrolled in secondary education, regardless of age, by the total population of secondary school-age students. This ratio is multiplied by 100 to produce the final percentage. Population data used in calculations are obtained from different national or international databases, many from the United Nations Population Division or UNESCO.

15. *Government-dependent* private institutions—as opposed to independent private institutions—are subsidized by the state and must follow special government regulations.

16. In Latin America Masonry has been an important secret society that has influenced elites throughout the history of the republics. Adhering to an anti-Catholic ideology, it has been open to liberal (even radical) and anticlerical political options.

17. The Chilean case is not necessarily representative of the rest of Latin America today; Chile is more modernized and its educational reforms, including the expansion of private education, have gone farther. Yet it is plausible to imagine that other Latin American countries will converge on this structural model once educational reform and modernization advance, especially since the weight of the evidence suggests that these reforms and processes will follow broadly similar patterns.

18. These concepts are associated with the important principles coming out of the World Conference on Education for All, Meeting Basic Learning Needs, held in Jontiem, Thailand, in 1990. Its main resolutions were a statement on the inherent right of all children to a full cycle of primary education; commitment to a child-centered concept of education in which individual differences are accepted as a source of diversity and a challenge rather than a problem; improvement in the quality of primary education, including improvements in professional training and the provision of more flexible schooling with respect to organization, process, and content; greater parental and community participation in education;

recognition of the wide diversity of needs and patterns of primary school children's development, necessitating a wider and more flexible range of responses; and commitment to a developmental, intersectoral, and holistic approach to education and care of primary school children.

19. There is a positive difference of 9 and 8 points, respectively, and the correlation (Pearson's $r = 0.078$) is statistically significant at the 0.05 level ($p = 0.013$).

20. In 1918 a group of students at the Universidad de Córdoba, in northern Argentina, launched a movement that would have vast consequences for universities across the entire continent. In addition to societal democratization, the student movement advocated for the secularization and democratization of universities, which up to that point had been very elitist and traditional.

21. These were ordinary people with extraordinary life stories and often with tragic fates, in whom other people see signs of a miraculous intervention by God. After death they have been "canonized" by popular faith (although regarded with mistrust by the Catholic Church) and have been turned into massive objects of popular devotion in their respective countries.

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